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DO  UNION  WEALTH CONCESSIONS  EXPLAIN  TAKEOVER  PREMIUMS? 
THE  EVIDENCE  ON CONTRACT WAGES 
ABSTRACT 
I  estimate  changes  in  levels of union real wage  growrh associated  with 
corporate  takeovers  and accompanying  chief executive  officer  changes.  Ihe 
effects  are statistically  insignificant.  The results are used to construct 
union  wealth  changes  assotiated  with corporate  control events.  Target  fire 
shareholder  wealth  premiums  are  estimated using  a simple  market  model.  The 
union  and shareholder  wealth  changes  are compared,  and I conclude  that 
transfers  of wealth from unions  to shareholders  ate not an economically 
significant  explanation  of shareholder  wealth  premiums. 
Joshua  Roaett 
National  Bureau  of Economic  Research 
1050 Massachusetts  Avenue 
Cambridge,  MA 02138 Empirical  studies  show  that tsrget firm  shareholder  wealth  increases  when 
a  takeover occocsj  The sources  of  the wealth  increase  sre not well 
understood.  Most explanations  of takeover premiums  fall into one of two 
categories:  efficiency  or transfer.  The efficiency  hypothesis  states  that 
newly  expected  reallocation  of poorly  performing  resources  into more highly 
valued  uses causes  upward  revision  of the expected  return  to owning  those 
resources.  The  share price  is bid up,  and target  firm shareholders  receive 
the premium.  The alternative,  or transfer, hypothesis  attributes  target  firm 
shareholder  wealth increases  to transfers  from  other parties  with an interest 
in the firm.  The transfers  are expected  to occur as a result  of the takeovec, 
and this expectation  raises  share  prices.  Both explanations  may play  a role 
in the observed  target  firm shareholder  wealth  gains.  Other  hypotheses 
attribute  takeover  premiums  to increased  product market  power2  or 
irrationality  in stock  pricing. 
This study uses  both stock  market  and contract  wage data to determine  the 
extent  to which target firm shareholder wealth  increases  are accounted  for by 
transfers  from  unions.  The changes  in union  wage growth  associated  with 
takeovers  and accompanying  chief  executive  officer  (CEO) changes3  are 
estimated  and the implied union  wealth  changes associated  with takeovers  ate 
calculated.  These wealth  changes  are then compared  to the corresponding 
wealth  changes  experienced  by target  firm  shareholders  in association  with 
takeovers. 
For corpanies  traded  on the New York  or American  Stock  Exchanges  and for 
which  the Bureau  of National  Affairs  reported at least one union  contract 
settlement  between  1976 and 1987,  the data indicate  the following  regarding 
the effect  of takeovers  and CEO changes on  the level  of the rate of growth of 
real wages  measured  in percentage  terms:  the lower bound  for a takeover 2 
accompanied  by a CEO change  is about  —1% per year.  Hence  if real wage growth 
for the firm was  .5% per year prior  to the takeover/CEO  change,  it would  be 
—.5% per year afterwards.  The lower bound  for a takeover  alone  is about  —.6% 
per year.  The upper bounds  are, roughly,  +3% following  a takeover  alone, and 
no effect  for a takeover with a CEO change. 
Lower bound estimates  come from  regressions  that  do not allow  sector— 
apecific  takeover  effects,  so they  are essentially  sample  mean  effects.  Tho 
lower bounds  are statistically  insignificant.  Upper  bounds  come  from 
specifications  that  allow  sectoral  disaggregation  of effects.  Upper  bound 
estimates  vary both  between  sectors  and within  sector  across  specifications, 
but within  the largest  sectors  (durables  and non—durables  manufacturing) 
estimates  are statistically  significant  end generally  more stable  than for ths 
lower bounds. 
The wage effects  are economically  insignificant  in  the sense  that tho 
implied union  wealth  gains  or losses  are small  relative  to shareholder  wealth 
gains  at the time of  a takeover  announcement.  Under  assumptions  designed  to 
give the transfer  hypothesis  the greatest  chance  of  success  and using 
statistically  insignificant  parameter  estimates  from specifications  nor 
favored by the data,  the median  value  of the shareholder  wealth  gain that  can 
be explained  by union  concessions  is 12%.  When the same assumptions  are used 
in conjunction  with  results  least  favorable  to the transfer hypothesis,  union 
wealth  actually  increases  following  a takeover,  by up to 4% of the value  of 
the shareholder  wealth  premium.  Given  these extremes  and the assumptions  that 
generate  them,  I conclude  that transfers  of union wealth  do not explain  target 
firm shareholder  gains. 3 
The paper  haa aix sections.  Section T summarizes  related  literature  and 
indicates  the contribution  of this paper.  Section II describes  the data. 
Section  III addresses  the representativeness  of the sample.  Section  IV 
presents  the empirical  findings  regarding  contract  wage growth  rates  and 
takeovers.  Section V compares  union  wealth  changes  associated  with takeovers 
to target firm  shareholder  wealth  changes.  Section VI draws conclusions. 
Section  I. 
Theories  regarding  the market  for corporate  control  support both the 
transfer  and efficiency  hypotheses  for takeover  premiums.  From the 
shareholder's  point  of  view,  management  performs  poorly  in  two ways:  either 
resources  are inefficiently  used,  or the portion of the wealth  genersted  by 
the ongoing  operations  of the firm  distributed  to shareholders  is too smal.l. 
Monitoring  coats  can cause  either sort  of poor performance  to be tolerated by 
shareholders  to some degree.4  If  performance  is sufficiently  bad that a third 
party  expects  the gain  from taking over  the firm  and improving  performance  to 
exceed  the cost  of the takeover,  the market  for corporate  control  provides 
external  disciplining  incentives.5  Competition  in  the msrket  for corporate 
ownership  ensures  that tsrget firm  share prices  sre bid up to reflect  the 
expected  increase in the value  of owning  those shares  in the post—takeover 
environment  (less  the costs  of  the takeover).6 
Event studies  of takeovers  do not generally  address the reasons  for the 
takeover  directly,  but they  do strongly  support  the role of the market  for 
corporste  control  in transferring  to  current  shareholders  the present  value  of 
some expected  incresse  in income from  owning  an  asset.  Some explanations, 
such as that of Manne  (1965), attribute  the lsrge premiums  to efficiency. 4 
However,  there  are relatively  few empirical  atudiea  that try to addreas 
efficiency.  Lichtenberg  and Siegel  (1987, 1989)  find  evidence  for increased 
productivity  following  ownership  changea.  They examine meaaurea  auch as total 
factor  productivity  using  large  samplea  of  eatablishment  level  Cenaua  Bureau 
data.  Ravenscraft  and Scherer  (1988) reach the opposite  conclusion  in an 
examination  of pre— and post—merger  performance  based  on accounting  measures 
of profitability. Healy,  Palepu,  and Ruback  (1989)  argue  that  cash—flew  is a 
better  accounting  measure of poat—merger  performance.  They  find post—merger 
improvements  in  asset productivity. 
Other authors have  emphasized  the role  of transfers  in explaining 
shareholder  wealth increases.  The potential  sources  of wealth  for such 
transfers  include  the following:  unions (which  will be examined  here)  and 
other employees;7  bidding  firm  shmreholders;8  the government  (in the form  of 
tax benefits  which could not be realized  without  the takeover);9  mansgementj° 
over—funded  pension  funds  that msy be raided  by new management;11  bondholders, 
if the risk  of default on pre—existing  bonds  is increased by the takeover  (as 
when  a highly  leveraged  takeover  is based on  junk—bond  financing);  and 
suppliers  of inputs  other  than labor.  Most  careful  empirical  studies of 
potential  sources  of transfers  have  not found systematic  explanations  across 
msny takeovers  of more than a small fraction  of the takeover premium. 
The additional  piece  of  the puzzle examined  here,  the role of union 
wealth  concessions,  has been emphasized  by Shleifer  and Summers  (1988).  They 
consider  the welfare  and efficiency  implications  of  hostile  takeovers  which 
impair  the ability  of  managers  and employees  to form implicit  contracts.  They 
make two arguments  supporting  the notion  that hostile  takeovers  are 
inefficient.  First, 5 
To take advantage  of implicit contracts,  shareholders  must  be trusted by 
potential  stakeholders.  Otherwise  stakeholders  would expect  breach 
whenever  it raises  the firm's  value  and  would  never  enter into implicit 
contracts.  (p38) 
A  hostile takeover  is one in  which  new managers  replace old managers  and 
breach  implicit  contracts.  The fact that such an  event  may occur  leads  to ox 
ante inefficiency  as the ability to contract  implicitly  is compromised.  This 
proposition  is difficult  to test as all firms face the same  environment  in  the 
market  for corporate  control and observable  differences  pre— and post—takeover 
are not relevant. 
Second,  they argue  that breaches  can cause  ex post inefficiency.  They 
examine  two aspects  of this story:  first, problems  such as informational 
asymmetries  between  the new owner  and employees  in an environment  of lack  of 
trust  lead to inefficient  contracting.  Second, transfers  may account  for a 
large  fraction  of the shareholder wealth  premium.  When  both of these 
conditions  hold,  there is ex post inefficiency. 
The weakness in the Shleifer  and Summers argument  is  that transfers  may 
not explain  the premium.  If  factors  such as increases  in productive 
efficiency  in  dimensions  other  than  labor explain  the premium,  then the net 
effect  of the takeover could  be a substantial  efficiency  increase.  Hence 
establishing  the magnitude  of transfers  is important  to the ex post 
inefficiency  case. 
Shleifer  and Summers  do not restrict  their analysis  to union  concessions. 
However,  if takovers  occur in order to appropriate  rents, then  the 
breach/transfer  model  they  posit  should  leave a trace in observed  union  wages. 
This  paper  contributes  to the takeover  literature  by providing  an additional  piece  of  evidence  regarding  the aourcea  of observed  target  firm 
stock  value  premiums. 
Section  II. 
This section  describes  the data  sources and the construction  of the data 
set used  here,  and it provides  tables of descriptive  statistics.  The 
principal  sources  of data used in this study are the tureau  of National 
Affairs'  (BNA) Collective  Bargaining  Negotiations  and Contracts  (CBNC)12  fiia, 
which  records  the details  of labor contract  settlements,  and the University  of 
Chicago's  Center  for Research  in Security  Prices  (CRSP) files,  which  cover 
stock  prices,  quantities,  and related information.  These  aourcea  jointly 
determined  the primary  sample  analyzed  in  the next section  and supplied  the 
basic information  necessary  for calculating  employee  and shareholder  wea].th. 
The unit of  observation  on  the ENA file is a contract  settlement  between  a 
company  (or employer  organization)  and a union.  The principal  data items used 
from  the BNA file  were company  and  union  identifiers,  an industry  code (SIC), 
the settlement,  effective,  and expected  expiration  dates of the contract 
(expected  length  is calculated  as expected  expiration  date minus  effective 
date)  ,  the  wage at the end of the previous  (expiring)  contract  (W0), immediate 
and scheduled  deferred  wage increases  and the dates  on  which  they  became 
effective,  information  regarding  cost of living  adjustment  (COLA)  clauses,  and 
the number  of  employees  covered.  CRSP  company  identification  numbers 
(CUSIPsP3 were matched  to the BNA records by hand  using  as much relevant 
identifying  information  as possible  from  both  sources.  The resulting  sample 
of 5,353  contracts  signed by 1,009 companies  over the period  January  1,  1976 
to June 30, 1987 includes all companies  for which  at  least  one contract 7 
settlement  was reported  by the ENA  between  January  1976 and June 1987,  and 
which  could  be matched  to  the CRSP tapes covering  the New York Stock  Exchange 
(NYSE) and the American  Stock Exchange  (AMEX)  through December,  1986.  Hence 
both wage and stock  information  are available  for all observations  in the 
sample 
Jage  profiles,  rates  of wage  growth,  and contract  costs  over  the  lives  of 
the contracts  were produced  using  the 8NA data  and auxiliary  information.  In 
general,  I assume  that expectations  formed at  the time of the contract 
settlement  follow  the simple  rule that  growth  rates  will  persist  at the levei 
observed  over the 12 months prior  to the settlement.  The nominal wage profile 
starts with W0, the wage  at the end of the previous  contract  (as recorded  by 
the ENA at the time  of the settlement),  and information  regarding  the contract 
settlement  is used to  project  the wage level  in each  month  of  the contract. 
For example,  a 36 month  contrsct  has P1  P36 in addition  to P0.  The 
projected  wage profile  reflects  sll immediate  and scheduled  deferred  wage 
incresses  as of the dates  specified  in  the contract,  and the COLA if it is 
present  snd active.  The COLA is evaluated using the 1967—based  CPI and,  as 
described  above,  the assumption  that,  at  the time of the contract  settlement, 
inflation  is expected  to persist  at  the rate observed  over the previous  12 
months.14  The real  wage  profile,  w, is constructed  from  the nominal pcofile 
using the CPI and the same assumption  concerning  the expected  rate of 
inflation.  The annual  percentage  growth  tste of the real wage over the 
contract  was calculated  as 8 
w  (12/36) 
w—lOOx  —1 
Wa 
for a contract  with and  expected  length  of 36  months,  and similarly  for other 
lengths. 
The expected  contracc  cost  per employee  for each  month,  t,  of the 
contract,  was calculated  using  the projected wages and auxiliary  information: 
x (H+l5xOT) x (l+F) x 4.3452 
C  =  t 
I  I r )1(t+M)  + 
where  is the nominal  wage in  month  t of the contract,  H is hours  worked,  UT 
is overtime  hoursj5  F is the value  of  fringe benefits16  as a fraccion  of 
payroll,  4.3452  is weeks per month,  r is Moody's  Baa corporate  bond  yield in 
the month  of the settlement  (converted  to a monthly rate),  and  M  is a 
correction  for the time  (in months)  from the settlement  to the effective  date 
of  the contract  (H,  OT, and F are all merged  to the concract  observations  by 
two—digic  SIC in  the year of the settlement) .  Hence C  is the expected 
current  dollar  present value  of the contract coat  per employee,  as of the 
settlement  date,  for month c of the contract.  The monthly  costa  can then  be 
aummed  to  produce  the preaent  value  of the total contract  coat or the coat for 
any sub—period  within  the contract.  Real dollar  figures use the CPI for 
deflation. 
Table 1 auaimarizea  the constant  (1967) dollar  wage,  wage growth,  and 
contract  coat figures.  The number  of contracts  obaerved  by year and sector 9 
can also be seen in  this  table.  Employment  weighted  means and standard 
deviations  are shown for all 5,353  observations  as well as for each  year 
(grouped by the aettlement  date of  the contract)  ,  whether  the contract  was in 
manufacturing  (SIC's  20—39) or  not,  and a further  disaggregation  into seven 
aectors.  The wage at the end of the previous  contract  (W0) and percentage 
annual wage growth  figures  jointly  contain much of wage information  from the 
BNA in compact  fotm.  Both  ace used  in the regression  specifications  of 
Section  IV.  The wage growth  figure  serves as the dependent  variable,  and 
is used in conditioning  variables.  In  addition,  Table 1 ahows  the present 
value  of the contract  cost per employee—year  in  thousands  of 1967 dollars. 
The union  wealth  changes  calculated  in  Section V  are based,  in  part,  on these 
numbers. 
Figures  1 and  2  give a visual  presentation  of the wage level and wage 
growth  information  in  Table  1 for all companies,  and manufacturing  and non— 
manufacturing  firms separately.  Figure  1 shows  the yearly (employment 
weighted)  average  real wage level  at  the end of the previous  contract,  and 
Figure  2 shows  the corresponding  real  wage growth  over the new contract.  The 
variation  in wage levels from  year to year reflects  both real factors,  which 
are evident  in the decline  in wage growth seen  in Figure  2,  and the sectoral 
composition  of new wage settlements,  which  varies  substantially  from  year to 
year.  The last seven  columns  of Table 4 show the sectoral  variation  over time 
in terms  of  employees  covered. 
Figures  3 and 4 present  the same information  at a finer degree of 
sectoral  disaggregation.  The main  reason  for presenting  these figures  is to 
show  that  most sectors behave  similarly  over this time—period,  but also that 
airlines  are evidently  quite  different  from the other  sectors.  Part of the 10 
difference  in wage levels can be explained  by the occasional  appearance  of a 
pilots'  union  contract,  with wages  an  order of magnitude  higher than other 
wages  in the data set.  However,  this explanation  is not so satisfactory  for 
rates  of real wage growth, which, as Figure 4 shows, persist at levels  much 
greater  than  all other sectors for most of the sample  period.  As will he 
elaborated  below,  this data set is deficient  with regard  to post—takeover 
contract  settlements  in  the airline  industry,  but the patterns  presented  in 
Figures  3  and 4 suggeet  that,  even if results  could be obtained  for airlines, 
they would not be broadly  representative  of industry  overall. 
Table  2 provides  a rough  check  of  the wage profile  predictions.  It 
compares  the realized  levels  of  wages  at contract  expirations  (W0)  in a given 
year with the predicted  levels  from  contracts  settled  in previous  years  and 
due to expire  in  the given year.  This rough check  of the data indicates  that 
the predicted  wage  profiles  end up  close  to observed  values  just prior  to the 
start  of subsequent  contracts.  Apart from  the first predicted  figure, which 
is based  on just 34 observations,  the largest differences  occur  for contracts 
signed  before  and expiring  during  or just  after  the receseion  of the early 
1980's.  This is not surprising  as expected and realized  inflation  (and other 
factors)  differ  over these years. 
Takeover  and  related  event information  was developed  as  followa:  using 
the CRSP tapes,  a list was produced  of  all companies  in  the sample  for which 
trading was suspended  at any time after January  1973.  This list served  as the 
basis for collecting  auxiliary  files regarding  takeovers  and related  events. 
Takeover  event  dates  and information  regarding  hostility,'7  CEO18  and other 
top management  changes  in conjunction with the takeover,  acquirer,  and form  of 
acquisition  were recorded  from  the Wall  Street  Journal  Index  (WSJI) 11 
(1973—1987)  Completion  of takeover date  and acquirer  were obtained  from  the 
Commerce  Clearing  House,  Capital  Changes Reporter  (1988).  Announcement  date, 
completion  date,  acquirer,  and various  comments  regarding  the bid were 
recorded  from  VT. Grimm  & Company, Mergerstats  Review  (1981—1987).  All data 
sources were compared  for corroboration  of announcement  and completion  of 
takeover  dates.  In  cases  of  inconsistency  between  sources,  the source with 
the most  explicit  date and event—type  reference  was used for analysis.  This 
rule dictated  the use,  in  general,  of announcement  dates  from the WSJI and 
completion  dates  from  Capital  Changes Reporter.  WSJI completion  dates  or 
Grimm's announcement  or completion  dates were  used on occasion,  if they 
appeared  to be more reliable  in  the given case. 
The auxiliary  files were used to merge the following  corporate  control 
events and dates  to the contract  information:  takeovers,  hostility  in the 
takeover process,  and CEO changes associated  with the  takeover.  Table  3 
summarizes  the event indicators.  Of the 1,009  companies  represented  in the 
data set, 288 were taken over after January  1973.  In 43 cases,  the WSJI 
indicated  that the takeover was 'hostile'  and that in 68 cases, a CEO change 
accompanied  the takeover.  The table  also shows  the distributions  of contracts 
(as a single  company  can generate more than  one contract  at a time) with 
events  indicated.  The event  information  is set up to indicate  not just that 
the event  occurred,  but whether  it occurred  before or after  the current 
contract  settlement  date.  Only  the first  two contracts  following  the takeover 
are considered.  Very few contracts  are observed beyond that point,  and it  is 
reasonable  to expect that if  takeovers  occur because of the possibility  of 
wage reductions,  then a significant  effect  (economically  as well  as 
statistically)  should  be evident within  the first six to nine years  following 12 
the takeover.  The indicators  for CEO and other management  changes  associated 
with a takeover  take on the value 1 only if the takeover  indicator  also  takes 
on the value 1,  so these  indicators  capture the marginal  effect  of,  for 
example,  a CEO change,  given that a takeover occurredJ9 
Section  III. 
This  section  discusses  the representativeness  of the sample.  The sample 
covets a large proportion  of both the total unionized  work force  in  the U.S. 
and of  all firma  traded  on the NYSE  or  AMEX.  Furthermore,  the frequency  of 
takeovers  does not appear  to differ  greatly between  the sample  and the CRSP 
population.  Unfortunately,  the number  of observed  contracta  declines 
following  a takeover.  This  may bias the results presented  in  the following 
sections,  but there  is some evidence  that the potential  biaa ia not aevere. 
The aample covers  a substantial  portion  of the total  unionized  work force 
in  the U.S.  Table  4 shows  the number  of  employees  covered by contracts  signed 
in each  year of  the sample  (column 3) and the number  of union  members  in the 
U.S.  in  the same year (column 2).  All figures  in the table  are in thousands 
of union  members.  As moat contracta  laat three years,20  the number  of 
employees  covered in  the SNA data  in  a given year  can be estimated  by summing 
the total coverage  figures  over  three year  windows  (column 4).  Column  5 shows 
the number  of union  members  covered  in  the BNA data as a percentage  of total 
U.S.  union  membership  in the aame  year.  More  than 15% of the unionized  work— 
force  is covered  in this study. 
The 1,009 companies  in the sample  cover only about  one fifth of the 
companiea  listed  on the CRSF tapea covering  the NYSE and the AMEX (the CRSP 
tapea  covered  5,019  through 1986,  but the number  with  valid information  during 13 
the sample period  is somewhat  smaller  as companies  no longer  traded are not 
deleted  from  the tapes) 
.  Under  the hypothesis  that takeovers  occur  at least 
partly  in response  to rent—seeking  opportunities,  takeovers  might  be more 
prevalent  among  more  highly  unionized  firms.  The takeover  information  used 
for the empirical  analysis  presented  in  the next section  is not exactly 
comparable  to the CRSP information  regarding  trading stoppages,  but Table  5 
compares  the frequencies  of CRSP trading Status  codes  for the three main 
categories  (still  trading,  mergers,  and exchanges)  between  companies  in the 
sample  and not in  the sample.  There  is no apparent  difference  in the 
frequencies  as the Chi—square  test for homogeneity  between  the groups  is only 
significant  at the  .30 level. 
A potentially  serious  drawback  in this data set is that fewer  contracts 
are observed  following  takeovers  than  before.  Identifying  target  company 
contracts  in the post—takeover  environment  was done  both  by matching  the names 
of units which retained  their pre—takeover  names  and by checking  contracts 
signed with  acquiring  companies  to  see if any could be re—assigned  to the 
original  company.  The former  procedure was most  likely  possible  for divisions 
of target  firms which  were taken  over and then  continued  to operate  as a 
division  of the acquiring  firm  while  retaining  their original  names.  The 
latter procedure  resulted  in only  a few additional  post—takeover  contracts. 
feel that  most of the contracts  that could be positively  identified  as being 
between  the former target  company  and one of its unions  were discovered  by 
these methods. 
Despite  these  efforts,  the number of  contracts  observed  per year  at risk 
of reporting  declines  following  a takeover.  This  measure  has the advantage  of 
controlling  for the length  of time  over  which  reporting  occurs.  For a company 14 
not taken  over,  the measure  of contract observations  per year at risk is 
01=N1/ll.5,  where  N1 is the number  of  contracts  observed  for the given 
company,  and 11,5 is the number  of  years  from  1/1/76  to 6/30/87.  For a 
company  with  a takeover,  two additional  statics  are calculated:  02—N2/T2, 
where  N2—contracts  prior to the completion  of the takeover,  and T2=the  number 
of  years  from 1/1/76  to the completion  of  the takeover;  and 03=N3/T3,  where 
Ny—contracts  following  the takeover,  and T3=the  number of years from  the 
completion  of the takeover  to 6/30/87. 
Table  6  shows  the distributions  of  these  three  statistics  by giving  the 
values of each  at each  quartile  and extreme values,  and the mean and standard 
deviation  for each.  The mean  number  of  contracts  observed  per year  declines 
by about half following  a takeover.  This  would  be an indication  of  a serious 
sample  selection  bias if the decline were due to dramatic  reporting  declines 
for some firms and no decline  for others.  In this case, wage growth  rates 
could  be highly  correlated  with reporting  (if, for example,  union—busting 
takeovera  occur),  causing  a sample  selection bias.  However,  if average 
observed  contracts  per year decline  for all firms equally  following  the 
takeover,  then  such a bias would  only be present if  there was great variation 
in the effect  of the takeover  on wage growth within  each firm, and the 
contracts  with lower  wage growth  were the ones  not reported.  As the next 
section  will show,  there  is little  evidence that  wage growth  reductions  are 
associated  with the contracts  actually  observed  following  takeovers.  Given 
this,  the presence  of other  contracts  from  the same firms  that feature both 
much larger  wage reductions  and non—reporting  seems unlikely.  A  more 
plausible  explanation  for the case  of  proportional  declines  in observed 15 
contracts  is that  matches  are simply  more  difficult  to make  as the identifying 
information  changes. 
The former  case, which  would indicate a serious  potential  for sample 
selection  bias,  would  cause  the values  of contracts  per year at the lower 
percentiles  to be lower  for post—  than  for pre—takeovers,  while  the values  at 
the upper  percentiles  would  be  unchanged.  This would  also increase  the 
standard  deviation  in the post—takeover  period.  The implication  of the latter 
case  is  that contracts  per year  would  decrease  proportionately  at each 
percentile,  and the standard  deviation  would  be reduced.  Table 6  supports  the 
latter  case,  which  reduces  the worry  of  sample selection  bias.  The apparent 
relative  decrease  in observations  per year in the lower percentiles  of the 
post—takeover  column  reflects  the fact that for many companies  only  one 
contract  is observed,  so zero contracts  observed  per year is reached  at 
roughly  twice  the percentile  rank as for the pre—takeover  distribution. 
Finally,  even if sample selection  biases  are present,  they would  have to be 
extremely  severe to change  the economic significance  of the findings  in 
Sections  IV and V. 
Despite  the evidence  that, overall,  the reduction  in observed  contracts 
following  takeovers  may not be a problem,  there  are particular  instances  in 
which it is.  Most  notably,  no post—takeover  contracts  could  be found  for the 
airline  industry,  which  is one of the major  examples  in  the Shleifer  and 
Summers  analysis.  Hence  no direct  response  can be made to their stylized 
example  involving  TWA.  However,  Figures  3  and 4 made it clear  thet airlines 
were a special  case during  the sample  period. 16 
Section  IV. 
This section  provides  empirical  evidence  on  the pattern  of union  wage 
growth  relative  to takeovers  and CEO changes.  Employee  wealth  changes 
presented  in Section  V are based  on the results  shown  in  this section. 
The primary  goal in running  the regressions  presented  here is to 
determine  the extent  to which  wage growth  is associated  with takeovers  and CEO 
changes,  other things  equal.  The dependent  variable  is the compound  annual 
percentage  growth  rate of the wage level over the contract,  as described  in 
Section TI and summarized  in Table  I.  The relation  between  wage growth  and 
corporate  control events  is explored  using  indicators  for takeovers  and CEO 
changes both independently  and interacted  with other  regressors.  These 
indicators  are constructed  as follows. 
There  are three  mutually  exclusive  classes  representing  a takeover:  no 
takeover  for the given  company  either  before or (up to two contracts)  after 
the current  contract  settlement  date;  a takeover  (up to two contracts) 
following  the current  settlement  date (PlO)  ;  or a takeover prior to that  date 
(PTO).  The no—takeover  category  is omitted as the base case.  If  the takeover 
is associated  in time with a change  in regime  regarding  wages,  then  the 
difference  between  the parameter  estimates  associated  with the two included 
indicators  should  capture  it, and a test of their  equality  (PTO = FTO)  is 
appropriate  for  determining  such  a difference.  If  the two parameters  are nor 
different  from  each  other  but are both different  from zero,  then there  is some 
systematic  difference  between  companies  involved in takeovers  and other 
companies,  but the manifestation  of  this difference  observable  in  wages  does 
not change  when the takeover  occurs. 17 
Additional  indicators  are  included for a CEO change accompanying  the 
takeover,21  one for pre— (PTC) and one for post—takeover  (FTC) contract  wage 
settlements.  These  can only  have a  value  of 1 if  the corresponding  pre—  or 
post—settlement  takeover  indicator  is  equal  to 1.  The interpretation  of the 
parameter  estimates  is the marginal  effect of the CEO change,  given  that the 
takeover  occurs.  The total  effect  of the takeover  and CEO change  is the sum 
of the parameter  estimates  of takeover  and CEO change.  As in the takeover 
with no CEO change  case,  a test  of the marginal  association  of the CEO change 
with  wage growth  is that the indicators  for pre— and post—takeover  joint  with 
a CEO change  are equal  (PTC  FTC).  Similarly,  the total  effect  of a takeover 
joint with a CEO change  can  be judged  by a test of PTO + PTC  — FTO + FTC. 
Previous  work  with these  data (Rosett (1989)) has shown that,  although 
there  is some variation  of the wage growth  response  to the takeover  as time 
(contracts)  passes,  grouping  the data by the number  of  contracts  or  years 
since  the takeover  produces  poorly  estimated and,  when  statistically 
significant,  contradictory  results.  The data  do not appear  to be able  to 
support  any detailed  tracing  of wage effects over  time  past the takeover.  The 
number  of  contracts  observed  at points  more than  two contracts  following  the 
takeover  is small  and  wage effects  for those contracts  are generally 
insignificant.  Also,  differences  between  the wage coefficients  when the 
takeover  effect  is limited  to one contract  or  two are small, so I have chosen 
to estimate effects by  pooling  up  to  two  contracts  following  the takeover. 
This  choice  is arbitrary,  but unimportant  with respect  to parameter  estimates. 
Several regressors  are included  to control  for economy—wide  and sectoral 
conditions.  Macroeconomic  variables  include  (the  rates of  growth  over  the  12 
months prior to  the settlement of)  the  unemployment rate,  the  CPI,  and  real 18 
(1982—100)  CNP.  In addition,  the difference  between  the wage at the end of 
the expiring  contracr  and the (two—digit  SIC)  industry  average wage in the 
month  of the settlement  (expressed  as a percent  of the industry wage),  and the 
log of the wage at the end of the expiring  contract  are included  as  well.  All 
regressors  are entered  linearly  and as squares.  F—statistics  for the joint 
significance  of the squared  terms  indicate  their  inclusion  at the  .001 
level  22 
The summary  statistics  and graphs in  the previous  section  indicate  that 
teal  wage growth  from 1976  to 1981 was changing  dramatically,  first rapidly 
falling  and then  rising.  From  1982—1987,  the pattern  was much more stable  and 
was characterized  by alight  erosion of real  wages.  The apparent  change  of 
regime beginning  with the long expansion  of the 1980's  indicates  that some 
sort of time effects  may be useful  as  proxies  for omitted  regressors  if the 
available  macro—  and industry—level  information  is not sufficient  to explain 
much of the variance  in wage  growth.  Similarly,  sector  indicators  capture 
differences  across  sectors  explained by fundamentals  such  as the regulatory 
climate  in  the given  industry,  the state of supply of raw materials  or demand 
for the product  of that  industry  (which may not be highly  correlated  across 
industries  or sectors). 
Two methods  were tried for both time  and industry  effects.  For time 
effects,  indicators  for the year  of settlement  of  the rontract  (excluding  1976 
as the base  year)  and a period  effect  for the 1980's expansion  (effectively 
allowing  a structural  shift  in 1982) were both  tried.  For industry 
differences,  both including  as many  two—digit  SIC indicators  as possible  and 
dividing  the sample  into  seven  larger  aectora23  (excluding  services  as the 
base)  were tried. 19 
Table 7  ahows  four specifications  using  the full sets of year and SIC 
indicators  in addition  to the macro—  snd industry—level  quantitative 
regressors.  Using  the set of settlement  year indicators  is strongly  supported 
by an F—test  for their  joint  significsnce,  which rejects  the hypothesis  that 
they  are jointly  zero at the  .0001 level.  The same  is true for  the full set 
of SIC indicators.  In all four specifications,  the point  estimates  on che 
pre— and post—takeover  indicators  support  the hypothesis  that  wages  rise  more 
quickly  than average prior to and less quickly  than average  following  a 
takeover.  However,  the effects  are uniformly  small and statistically 
insignificant.  For takeovers  without  CEO changes,  the estimated  level  of wage 
growth  declines  from  before to after  a tskeover by —0.36% per year 
(  —0.03  — 0.33)  in the first specification,  and is highest in the third 
specification  (—.6% per year).  The marginal  effects  of a CEO change  wich the 
takeover  are as expected  in the third  and fourth  equstions,  indicating  even 
higher  increases  before  and lower  after  the takeover.  However,  they  are 
reversed  in  the first  two specifications,  and again  all estimates  are 
insignificant.  If CEO change  effects  sre included,  the largest  estimated 
decline  in the level of wage growth is  —1.04%  per year (= —0.24  —0.03  — 0.31  — 
0.46)  in the fourth  specification.  Hence  if real  wsge growth  was  1.04% per 
year prior  to a takeover  (which,  in  the fourth  specification,  indicates  that 
wages  were growing  .27% per year faster than  they  otherwise  would  have been), 
then  the largest  estimated  effect would  lower real  wage growth  to zero.  In 
the first  specification,  the level  of wage  growth  increases  .12%  per year 
following  a takeover  and CEO change. 
In addition  to being individually  insignificant  according  to the 
t—statistics,  the event indicator  estimates  are generally  insignificant  in 20 
other  tests.  The F—statistic  for the joint  significance  of the four 
indicators  does not reject  the hypotheais  that they  are all equal  to zero in 
the first  two specifications.  For the first  specification,  that  statistic  is 
F(4,5290)  = .66, with the probability  of a greater  F value of  .62.  The 
statistic  is similar  for the second  specification.  However,  the four 
indicators  are found  to be jointly  significantly  different  from  zero in the 
last two specifications,  with probability  of a greater  F of .02 and .04, 
respectively. 
Tests of equality  of the pre—  and post—takeover  parameter  estimates,  as 
discussed  earlier in  this section,  also show  mixed  results.  None of the three 
tests reject  the null for the first  two specificstions.  The highest  level  of 
significance  among  the six tests  is for the test that the pre—tskeover  and 
post—takeover  indicators  are the same in  the second  equation,  which has a 
probability  of a greater  F value  of .10.  In the last  two equations,  equality 
of the pre— and post—takeover  indicators  is rejected  in both  cases  (at the  .02 
and  .04 levels,  respectively),  while  equality  of the pre—  and post—CEO  change 
estimates  are not significsnt  even  at the  .10 level.  The last test,  for the 
equality  of the totsl effects  of takeover  and CEO—change  pre—  and pos  t— 
takeover,  is significant  at the .02  level  in the third  and fourth 
specificstions. 
Overall,  these  findings  do not support  a statistically  significant 
relation  between  takeovers  (with or without  CEO changes)  and  wage growth.  The 
first  specification  is most strongly  favored  by tests  for the inclusion  of 
yesr and SIC indicators.  This specification  shows  a decline  in  wsge growth 
following  a takeover  alone, and an increase  following  a takeover  and CEO 
change.  All significsnce  tests  indicste  no statistical  relstionship  in this 21 
specification.  All point estimates  are insignificant  in  all specifications, 
and a few joint  tests  are significant  in  unfavored  specifications. 
One objection  to these  results  is that no account  is taken  of sector 
specific  variation  in takeover  effects.  Such  effects  can not be examined 
using the full sets of year and industry  indicators,  as degrees  of freedom  are 
quickly  used up in year/SIC  cross—effects.  Instead,  the specifications  shown 
in Table  8 are based  on period  and sector  groupings,  and they  appear  to 
capture  most of the variance  explained  by the year and SIC  indicators.  These 
specifications  have the advantage  of allowing  cross—effects  to be estimated 
and tested.24  These  cross—effects  may be important  if, for example,  the 
regulatory  climate  changes  within  an  industry  over  time (as it did in airlines 
and trucking). 
The  first  specification  in Table  8 has the interpretation  of allowing  a 
structural  break in 1982  (for all aspects of wage determinants  other than 
takeovers)  as the period  indicator  is interacted  with the other  regressors  as 
well.  An F—test  for the joint significance  of the period  indicator  and its 
interactions  with the other  regressors  has the interpretation  of a Chow test2 
for the structural  shift.  In a specification  excluding  all takeover  and CEO 
change  indicators,  this  test is significant  at the  .0001 level. 
The sector  indicators  exclude  the FIRE (Finance,  Insurance,  and Real 
Estate) and other services  sector  as the base.  Hence  if interactions  of the 
six included  sectors  and the four  takeover—related  indicators  are made,  there 
are 24 possible  indicators  which capture  the marginal  effects  of each  event  in 
each sector,  in addition  to the main effects.  As the four uninteracted  event 
indicators  and the six uninteracted  sector  indicators  are  included  as  well, 22 
the base case is a service sector  contract  for a firm that  does not experience 
a takeover  between  1973 and 1987. 
In Table  8,  the change  in wage  growth  within  a sector  from before  to 
after  a takeover  (with no CEO change)  is the difference  between  the 
uninteracted  takeover  estimates  plus the difference  between  the interacted 
takeover  estimates  within  the given  sector.  For example,  in the first 
apecification,  the effect of a takeover  (with no CEO change)  in  durables 
manufacturing  is (—1.99) — (+45)  + (+2.77)  — (0)  33.  The overall  effect 
of a takeover  in  durables  is actually  to increase  wage growth  slightly. 
Table 9 auamiarizes the wage growth  changes  from before to after  takeovers 
(and CEO changes)  by industry  for industries  for which all necessary 
coefficients  could  be  estimated.  The increased  wage growth  result  found  for 
the first  specification  in  durables  manufacturing  is found  in two other 
apecifications  for durablea,  and in  all four cases  for both non—durables  and 
transportation/utilities.  When  CEO change  effects  are  included as well,  the 
signs  reverse  in all sectors  for which estimates  of all parameters  could be 
obtained,  but the effects  are modest. 
Only mining  shows a relatively  large wage effect  in  the expected 
direction  (for the transfer hypothesis),  and then only for takeovers  without  a 
CEO change.  Table 3 shows that  mining  accounts  for only  2.5% of  the contracts 
in the sample.  The point  estimates  for mining  are not significantly  different 
from  zero. 
The results  shown  in  tables  8 and 9 again  do not support wage growth 
reductions  following  takeovers.  Rather,  the opposite  now appears  to be true 
in many cases.  Further,  the point  estimates  are more stable  across 
specifications  and in many  cases  statistically  significant  at the 5% level  in 23 
Table 8.  However,  the magnitudes  of the effects  are again quite small.  There 
is evidence  that a CEO change with the takeover  reduces wage growth  in 
manufacturing,  but this result  is reversed  in mining. 
The results of this section  do not support the hypothesis  that union 
wages are strongly  affected by takeovers.  Estimates  of the change  in tha 
level  of teal wage  growth  from  before  to after  a takeover  (and CEO change) 
range  from a reduction  of  about  1% to and increase  of  about  .3%.  The 
estimates  of reductions  are statistically  insignificant,  and the results  are 
not robust  to the specification.  Results  also differ  across  sectors.  The 
most reasonable  conclusion  is that there  is no clear pattern of wage growth 
changes  associated  with takeovers  and CEO changes. 
Section  V. 
This section  compares  union  wealth  changes  calculated  from the results  of 
Section  IV to target firm  shareholder  wealth  changes associated  with 
takeovers.  Estimates  of union  wealth  changes  are made  under  assumptions 
designed  to show  the largest possible  concessions  or gains  given  the results 
of rho previous  section.  Target firm shareholder wealth  premiums  are 
estimated  using  a simple  market  model,  and the magnitudes  of the premiums  are 
well  within the normal  rsnge.  This procedure  gives  the transfer  hypothesis 
its best chance  to explain  takeover  premiums.  It also allows  some perspective 
on the economic  significance  of  the findings  in the previous  section. 
Employee  wealth  changes  associated  with takeovers  are calculated  as 
follows:  Real contract  costs per employee—year  were calculated  for each 
contract  (see Table  1)  .  These  are used  to find the average  real cost  per 
employee—year  in the pre—takeover  time period, C, for each firm taken  over. 24 
The average  rata of real  wage  growth, w,  prior to the takeover  ia found  for 
each fira.  Estimates  of  changes  in level of the rate of  wage  growth  from 
before  to after takeovers  and CEO changes,  d, were taken from the regression 
results  in the previous  section.  Aasuming  contract  costs  are linear  in  wagaa, 
the information  above  and the intereat rate at the time of the takeover,  rt 
(Moody's  Baa corporate  rate),  are sufficient  to calculate  the present  value  of 
the change  in contract  costs per union member  over the first  two contracts 
(assumed  to he 3 years  each) following  the takeover  as 
6  n  n 




This calculation  allows  the effect of  the change  in the level  of wage growth 
to compound  over the aix year  period.  Hence the full estimated  effect  in the 
previous  section  is firar calculated. 
It is not reasonable  to assume  that the decrease  in wage  growth  persists 
indefinitely,  as the mean real wage growth  in  the sample  is just 0.17%  per 
year.  A  reduction  by 0.6% per year implies real wages  declining 
asymptotically  to zero.  A more realistic  assumption  is that wage levels  are 
lowered  at first  (relative to what they would  have been in  the absence  of the 
takeover)  but that the growth  rate reverts  to the  industry—  or economy—wide 
rate  over time.  The movement  to a new wage  path parallel  to the old one 
implies  constant  wealth  concessions  per year after  some  point. 
The infinite horizon  present value of such  a yearly  concession  is the 
measure  used  here for the wealth  concession  per employee.  It is calculated  oa 25 
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This  formula  finds  the infinite horizon  present  value  of the perpetuity  with 
the yearly  value  V  where  V solves 
6 
V  = 
nT  (l+rt)n 
6 
That is, it  extends  the six equal yearly  concessions  implied by W6 to a 
pbraanent  basis. 
Finally,  rather than  multiply  the wealth  change  per union  member  figure 
by the number  of  employees  covered by each  contract,  total union  employment 
figures  for each firm are estimated  by obtaining  total employment  figures  for 
each  firm at the tiae of  the takeover26  and multiplying  them  by the percent 
unionized  in the sector.27  These figures are generally  larger  than estimates 
from the sample as  contracts  are missing.  The  implicit assumption  that fira 
production  worker  employment  does  not change  much following  takeovers  is 
empirically  supported  by Lichtenberg  and Siegel  (1989) and Brown and  Medoff 
(1988).  The calculations  described  should  provide a good  chance  for wage 
growth  reductions  to explain  takeover  premiums. 
The estimates  of target firm  shareholder  wealth  changes  are calculated 
from  a simple  market  model  of  the form 26 
Rc  = ai + 
fliRMt  + 
where  Rit is the monthly  return  for firm  i in  month  t, R  is the value— 
weighted  market  return  (including  dividends)  in  month  t,  and e  is a classical 
disturbance  term.  The excese return  was calculated  over the month containing 
the first mention  of the takeover.  This procedure  is standard  and the details 
are omitted.28 The median  of  the premium  distribution  is 25%, which is well 
within  the typical  range  for event  studies of takeover wealth  effects.  To 
make the dollar  figures comparable  to the union  wealth  change  figures,  they 
have been deflated  by the 1967—based  CPI. 
Table  10 summarizes  the wealth  change  information.  Each column  from the 
second  to the seventh shows  a distribution  with values at the percentile  ranks 
shown  in the first  column.  The second  column  shows  the distribution  of 
(constant)  dollar  amounts of the shareholder  wealth  change, while the third 
shows  the distribution  of premium  percentages.  The fourth  to the seventh  show 
the distributions  of  the ratio  of union  wealth  concessions  to shareholder 
wealth gains using  the wage growth  change  coefficients  from the indicsted 
table  and specification.  Union  concessions  are positive  numbers,  and union 
gains  are negative  numbers.  Shareholder  gains  are positive  end losses  are 
negative.  Hence  negative  ratio values  indicate  that  shareholder  and union 
wealth  moved in  the same  direction.  The distribution  in each column  is 
ordered  independently  of the other  columns,  so figures at the same  percentile 
rank  in two different  columns  do not necessarily  correspond  to the same 
company.  All of  the information  necessary  to calculate  both union  and target 
firm  shareholder  wealth  could be found  for 212 companies,29  but coefficienta 27 
were not available  for all sectora  in the specifitationa  from  Table 8,  ao the 
last two distributions  have fewer  observations. 
The last four columns  show  the evidente  on the transfer  hypothesis.  The 
distributions  shown are for all takeovers  (with and  without  CEO changes) 
combined.  The fifth  column  is constructed  by combining  the coefficients  most 
favorable  to that  hypothesis  from the last two specifications  on Table 7. 
Even with the liberal  sssumptions  for constructing  wealth  concessions 
described  above  and mixing  the results  of two estimstions  to magnify  the 
effect,  at the median  only  12% of the shareholder  gain is explained  by union 
concessions.  The fourth column  is constructed  from the first  specificstion  on 
Table 7,  which  was  the most favored one  in  terms  of included regressors.  In 
this specification,  only  3% of the premium  is explained  at the median  value. 
The final  two columns  were  constructed  from the sector—specific  information 
from  Table 9.  In some sectors,  the effect of the takeover alone  was  to 
increase wage growth.  This is reflected  in the negative  values  at the medians 
in both columns.  In the sixth  column, the union  gains  4% of the shareholder 
wealth  increase.  The corresponding  figure  in the last column  is  2%. 
A  slightly  stronger  case for the transfer  hypothesis  can be made by 
looking  only  at takeovers  that include s CEO change.  The  final footnote  on 
Table 10 shows  the median  values  for the four distributions  in this case. 
Using the fourth  specification  from  Table  7,  the median  value  is 21%.  I 
present  this number  only in order to make the following  points:  It is possible 
to explain  one fifth  of the takeover premium  by union  concessions.  To accept 
this result,  however,  one must focus  only on  the results of the least  favored 
specification  (both year and industry  indicators  are excluded),  ignore 
statistical  insignificance,  and allow  the liberal  assumptions used in 28 
constructing  the union  wesith chsnges.  When yesr snd industry  effects  are 
included  (the first  specification  of Table 7),  the result  is reversed  in sign. 
In this case, unions  gain 2% of the value  of the shareholder  premium.  Both 
specificstions  based  on Table 9  show  modest  union  concessions  (5% and 6%) as a 
percentage  of shareholder  premiums.  Although  it is possible  to show larger 
concessions  by focusing  only  on takeovers  with CEO changes,  I believe  that the 
most reasonable  conclusion  is again  that the effect  is small.  These  resulte 
are not sufficiently  differen  from the results  for all takeovers  to warrant 
emphasis. 
The minimum  and maximum  values  in  the lsst  four columns  of  Table  10 
deserve  comment.  They  are all generated  in  cases  where  the shareholder  wealth 
change  is very small compared  to the median  value,  as documented  at the bottom 
of  the table.  Hence  small variations  in union  wealth  changes  can cause  large 
movements  in  the ratios.  Apart from  the two extreme values  at each end of 
each  distribution)  the ranges  are fairly  narrow.  These  characteriatica  of the 
distributions  make it  clearer  that that the median  values  are reasonable 
statistics  to represent  the overall  rate of transfer. 
The evidence  from this table  rejects  the proposition  chat  wealth 
transfers  from  unions explain  target  firm  shareholder  wealth  premiums. 
Rather,  there  is just  as much evidence  that unions  gain  when a takeover 
occurs.  In either  case,  the relative magnitudes  make it clear  that  union 
wealth  changes  associated  with takeovers  and CEO changes are economically 
insignificant  compared  to target  firm shareholder  wealth  changes. 29 
Section  VI. 
This paper  provides  empirical  evidence  that transfers  of wealth  from 
unions  do nor account  for target firm  shareholder  wealth  premiums.  Regression 
analysis  reveals  that reductions  in real wage growth sssociated  with takeovers 
and CEO changes  are statistically  insignificant,  and sectoral  decompositions 
show increased  real wage growth  in  major manufacturing  sectors.  In the 
extreme  specifications,  levels  of real wage growth  may be reduced  by up cc  1% 
annually  or increased  by up to .3%.  In more favored  specifications,  the 
effects  ste much smaller. 
Union  weslth  concessions  associated  with wage growth  reductions  were 
calculsted  under  assumptions  favorable  the transfer  hypothesis,  and one month 
target  firm  shareholder  wealth  premiums were calculated  using  a simple  market 
model.  These  figures were used to calculate  the ratio of union  concessions  to 
shareholder  premiums.  At  most,  12% of the shareholder  premium  can be 
explained.  At the opposite  extreme, union  wealth  increases  by 4% of the value 
of the shareholder  premium.  Again,  the effects  are smaller  in more reasonable 
specifications.  I  conclude  that the effects of takeovers  and CEO changes  on 
union  wages  and wealth  are both statistically  insignificant  and economically 
insignificant  in the sense  that they do  not explain  target firm takeover 
premiums. 30 
Footnotes 
1.  Most  studies  find that target firm  share  prices  rise 15% to 5O% around 
ths time  of the initiation  of the takeover,  with  variations  in the magnitude 
partly  explained  by the type of takeover.  See Jensen  and Ruback (1983), and 
Jarrell,  Erickley,  and Netter  (1988)  for summaries  of this  literature. 
2.  Eckbo  (1985), Eckbo  and Pier (1985), and McCuckin,  Warren—Boulton,  and 
3laldatein (1988)  provide  evidence  against  the market  concentration  hypocheaia 
using stock market  data. 
3.  CEO changes  are  included  as an  indicator  of 'hostility.'  Previoua  work 
with these  data  ahows  that traditional hostility  indicators,  such as 
resistance  by the target firm  board,  perform poorly  relative  to CEO changea 
(P.oaett,  1989).  I argue  that  CEO changes accompany  real shifts in  corporata 
strategy,  while  protestations  by board  members  at the time  of a takeover  bid 
contain  less  information. 
4.  Jensen  and Meckling  (1976) and Famm  and Jensen  (1983m,  1983b)  discuss 
monitoring,  agency  costa, and the separation  of ownership  and  control. 
5.  Manna (1965) provides  an insightful  discussion  of  the role  of the market 
for corporate  control  ma a disciplining  mechanism. 
6.  Rubmck  (1983)  provides  evidence  that  "...on average,  the successful  offer 
price  exhausts  the potential  gains  for unsuccessful  bidders"  (1983,  p.152). 
He concludes  that the market  for corporate  control  is competitive. 
7.  Brown  and Medoff  (1988) used a sample of Michigan  firma  to estimate  the 
effects  of takeovers  on wages  and employment.  Their  results  for wages  vary 
aomewhmt  by acquisition  type and the time period  examined,  ranging  from 5% 
higher  than  would  be expected  in the absence  of the acquisition  for  "aaaeta 31 
only'  acquisitions  (the bidder  purchases  the target's  assets  without 
absorbing  its work force)  ,  to 6% to 5% lower for acquisitions  involving 
changes  of ownership  with or  without  the integration  of the target  into an 
existing  firm (pp.19—20).  Their  analysis  is not explicitly  aimed at 
determining  whether  employee  wealth  is transferred  to shareholders  through 
takeovers,  but the results  do not appear  to support  that hypothesis. 
8.  Roll (1986) points  out that both  target  and bidding  firm wealth  effects 
must  be accounted  for in  determining  the extent  of wealth  creation  through 
takeovers.  If acquiring  firms  are larger than target  firms, then  even small 
negative  returns  to bidding  firm shareholders  may imply  zero or negative  net 
wealth  creation.  Roll defends  the possibility  of such  a result  on the basis 
of irrational  behavior  by managers:  "If there  actually  are no aggregate 
gains  in takeover,  the phenomenon  depends  on the overbearing  presumption  by 
bidders  that their valuations  are correct"  (Roll,  1986,  p.  200).  Bradley, 
Desai,  and Kim (1988) respond  to Roll's  point  using  a sample of 236 tender 
offer contests  using  matched  bidder/target  pairs.  All companies  were listed 
on  the NYSE or AMEX,  and all acquisitions  occurred  after  1963.  They fonrid 
company value  weighted  combined  returns of 7.43%, based  on .97% returns  for 
bidders  and 31.77%  for targets.  In  millions  of 1984 dollars,  they  found  mean 
wealth increases  of $17.3,  $107.08,  and $117.11 respectively  for bidders, 
targets,  and both combined. 
9.  Auerbsch  and Reishus  (1988) provide  evidence  that tax advantages  do not 
drive  takeover  activity.  They  show that the probability  of tax advantages 
through mergers  and acquisitions  is similar between  company pairs  actually 
involved  in takeovers  and pairings  made  randomly.  However,  Kaplan  (1989) 
finds  significant  tax effects  in the case of management  buyouts. 32 
10.  Lichtenberg  and Siegel  (1989)  find significant  cuta in central  office 
petaonnel,  but not for production  workers,  following  takeovers. 
11.  Pontiff,  Shleifer,  and  Weisbach (1989) find that pension  tevereions 
follow  toughly  10% of takeovers  (slightly higher for hostile,  lower  for 
friendly) ,  and  that the reversion  explains  roughly  10% of the takeover 
premium.  Hence,  roughly  1% of the value  in  takeovers  might  be explained 
through reversions,  However,  their evidence  that  the reversions  would not 
have occurred  in  the absence  of the takeover  is weak. 
12.  Published  every  othet  week in  the BNA Daily  Labor Report.  Contracts 
from 1/1/76  to 6/30/87  are used  here. 
i3.  The CRSP CUSIP  is described  on p.20  of the Msrch,  1986 edition  of the 
CRSP Stock File  User's  Guide. 
14.  COLAe  for contracts  settled after  1/1/83 wete evaluated  using  the 
opecefecs  of the COlA clause  available  in  the BNA  data.  COlAs priot to  that 
date were separately  coded  by Abowd,  who assigned  the expected  value  of  COlA 
payments  based on  Hendricks  and  Kahn (1985).  See Abowd (1989). 
15.  Average weekly  hours and overtime hours  were coded by year at the 2—digit 
SIC level  ftom  the Bureau  of Labor Statistics Employment,  Hours,  and 
Earnings,  United  States,  1909-84,  Volumes  I  and 2  (March  1985),  end the ELS 
Supplement  to Employment,  Hours,  and Earnings  (July 1987). 
16.  The average value  by yesr and 2—digit SIC of fringe  benefits  as a 
percent  of  wages was obtained  by adding  lines 1  (legally  required  payments, 
employer's  share  only),  2 (pensions,  insurance,  and other  agreed  upon 
payments,  employer's  share  only), and S (other  items) of Table 6  in  the 
U.S.Chamber  of Commerce  publication  Employee  Benefits  (1975,  1977—1986). 33 
17.  Hostility  is recorded  if  the  target  firm board or management  oppose  the 
bid,  legal  action  is taken  against  the bidder,  or the Wall Street  Journal 
Index characterizes  the bid as hostile. 
18.  Further  information  regarding  CEO changes not necessarily  associated  vith 
a takeover  was recorded  from the Forbes  annual  executive  compensation  summary 
(May or June,  1979—1988)  for as many  companies  as possible  in the full sample 
(not just companies  with trading  suspensions) 
.  In previous  versions  of this 
study these were included  in the regression  analysis  to account  for the 
independent  effect of CEO changes.  Excluding  this information  greatly 
simplifies  the interpretation  of the results without  substantially  altering 
them.  See Rosett (1989). 
19.  Also see Chapter  2 and the Data  Appendix  in Rosett (1989) and the Data 
Appendix  in Abowd (1989). 
20.  36 months  is both the median  and the modal  contract  length, as 3,379  of 
5,353  contracts  have that length.  1,137  contracts  last  20 months.  The mean 
and standard  deviation  are 32.5 and 7.1, respectively. 
21.  In previous  work  with these  data, a traditional  hostile  takeover 
indicator  was used in addition  to the CEO change  indicator.  The distribution 
of this  indicator  is shown  in Table  3.  The wage growth  effects  were  weaker 
and often  of the wrong sign  using  the hostile  indicator.  See Rosett (1989) 
22.  Alternative  specifications  including  interactions  of takeover  indicators 
with the quantitative  regressors  were explored  but not presented  as they 
complicate  the interpretation  without  providing  evidence  for stronger  wage 
effects. 
23.  Mining,  durable  manufacturing,  non—durable  manufacturing,  transportation 34 
and utilities (excluding  sir transportation),  airlines,  wholesale  and retail 
trade, and FIRE  (Finance,  Insurance,  and Real Estate)  and other  services. 
24.  Additional  specifications  in which  takeover  and CEO change  indicators 
were  interacted  with other  regressors  were explored.  In  particular,  changes 
io bargaining  power  or breaches  associated  with takeovers  can  be interpreted 
as altering  the responsiveness  of contracted  wage growth  to current 
differences  between  firm  and industry wages.  Interacting  the takeover 
indicators  with the firm—to—industry  relative  wage variable  should  captura 
aurh a change.  The results  were  not substantially  different  from the 
specifications  presented,  but are difficult  to interpret  and are omitted. 
25.  See Kennedy  (1985), page 186. 
26.  COMPUSTAT  data item  29 reports  the average  or year—end  employment, 
including  all part—time  and seasonal  employees,  and employees  of both doaestio 
and foreign  aubaidiariea.  See Section  8, P. 46 of the April  15,  l9E6 
Industrial  COMPUSTAT  guide.  In  most cases,  the employment  figure  is  for the 
year prior  to the completion  of  the takeover. 
For 49 companies,  COMPUSTAT  did not provide  information.  Figures  for 45 
ef these companies  were  obtained  from  Moody's,  again  for the year prior to the 
takeover  in moat  cases. 
27.  The sectors are as elsewhere  in this paper.  Figurea  on unionization  by 
sector  are from  the Bureau  of Labor Statiatica  Employment  and Earnings, 
January,  1987,  Table  60.  Figures  for 1985 are uaed. 
28.  Fama (1976) providea  an  extensive  review  of the methodology  and early 
event study literature. 
29.  Firm  level  employment  figures could  not be obtained  for a few companies, 35 
and companies  for which  contracts  are only observed  following  a takeover  are 
not included. 36 
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 Table 1 
Surooary  of real wage levels, growth  rates, and real contract coots, 
employment  weighted means and atandard deviations 
Real Wage 
at End of 
Secior  Year  Ohs 






Rate  Growth 
(as a  Percent) of 
Real Wage over 
New  Contract 








































































































































Retail &  Whole- 
sale Trade 














Sources:  BNA  "Collective Bargaining  Negotiations and Contracts," 1976 Ic 1987. 
BLA "Employment, Hours, and Earnings," 1985 (Supplement, 1987).  U.S.  Chamber of 
Cormcerce  "Employee Benefits," 1975 to  1987.  Author's calculations, 
ntes:  All  figures employment  weighted. 
Not inrluding airlines, 
"1' inance,  Insurance, and Real Estate. Table  2 







Real  Wage 





at End of 
Contract 
1976  502  3.43 
(1.12) 
. 
1977  769  3.90 
(2.61) 
34  3.42 
(112) 
1978  434  3.38 
(0.92) 
167  3.33 
(0,94) 
1979  398  3.68 
(2.21) 
512  3.88 
(3.16) 
1980  545  3.53 
(1.33) 
718  3.91 
(1.15) 
1981  508  3.21  430  3.70 
(1.27)  (2.19) 
1982  476  3.30 
(1.04) 
436  3.49 
(1.50) 
1983  423  3.81  496  3.37 
(1.11)  (1.54) 
1984  411  3.34 
(0.96) 
528  3.33 
(0.93) 
1985  356  3.49 
(1.14) 
406  3.24 
(1.50) 
1986  389  3.71 
(0.96) 
456  3.82 
(0.87) 
1987  142  3.31 
(0.89) 
374  3.25 
(1.13) 
'Collective  Bargaining  Negotiations  and 
calculations. 
Contracts,"  1976 to 1987,  and  Source: 
author's Table  3 
Canpanieo,  rontracte,  and events  by sector 
Total 










Cowpaniea  with 
Joint Takeovae 
and CEO Chance 
in  1973—1987 
Corpasacea  roth 
Contracts 
Following  Coop  a0005  cc  th 
a Joint  a bostilr 
Takeover  and  Takeover  in 





a brctc tO 
Takcnrar 
Macinc  12  4  3  1  C  I  T 
Moncfcntnrcng—  Ocrehlwe  344  114  58  29  t3  Ii  C 
Nlanntccturisg  — Nosdcrehlea  373  96  53  21  14  16  1 
hacirnos  25  9  0  5  0  2  1 
Transport  end Otilitiae  122  15  6  3  2  2  1 
tetaat/h'hnlasale  Trade  66  35  18  5  2  5 
P  1 5  1 P  555cr 5ecoea  47  15  7  3  2  2  : 




Contracts  Sews 








Contracts  Crow 
Cwapaniee with 
Joint Takarver 
and CEO Chwnge 
in 1973—1967 
Castrarte  Contrerte  Cron 
Folloring  Coespences with 
e Joint  a Soetclo 
Takeover  and  Takeover  n, 
CCI Change  1973—198 
Tnntnontn 
Iollnra:.t 
r  CTabnnn: 
Trvtnt  134  56  17  19  10  9  : 
Tanulanturtng 
—  Ourailea  1911  522  130  113  27  115  .' 
Tantorturctg—  Nondorablea  1924  449  93  (44  33  79 
Pcrtinrs  134  66  0  36  0  5  1 
Transport  and  Otilitiaa  339  56  12  6  1  4  : 
tctoal/Wholesala  Trade  578  228  83  (7  12  12 
5 7 P.O & Othor Oervccee  93  23  7  5  2  2  1 
Tntsl  5353  1404  322  403  65  225  CC 
burros.  068  'Collective  Bergaining  Negotiations  end  Contrasta,"  1976  to 1987.  Cocererce  Clearccg  booso "boparal  TSr'-' 
Pononten,"  1566  'Wall  Street  Jocrnel  ledee,"  (973  to 1987.  44.5. Incas  & To.  "Mergerstet  Revier," 1981  to  1057 Tab].. 0 
Number  of  union  members  in the U.S. end in the  Bureau of  National Affairs  somplo 
N.N.A. Date 
Den  torn 





Member-  AU 
shipa  Sectors 
All 
Sectors 























lf7U  22.153  1,591  2  D,14U  233  47  97  81  5 
1977  21,832  1,723  22  824  170  31  UiN  54  2 
1975  21,757  332  3,847  17.72  5  235  118  49  73  48  U 
1579  22,025  1493  3,730  17.02  2  1,UNU  255  43  48  US  C 
1SiU  2U,NUU  1,527  3152  lUND  23  833  139  32  U1S  S3  12 
1951  21,847  595  3,Ul5  17.52  7  275  139  Ui  94  U7  4 
1952  19571  932  3,051  iS.UD  S  SUS  120  ZN  Ui  94  U" 
0997  UN.U34  1,215  2,703  14.72  57  U33  102  03  311  54  Ii 
191"  UN,35N  1,072  3,220  57hZ  1  719  13N  54  7U  86  5 
1571  15,996  U24  2,911  17.12  U  298  129  SN  59  72  5 
ISiS  16.875  1,033  2.7Sf  1N.22  12  341  88  27  500  62  1 
1997  15.913  295  0  147  37  2  13  UI  U 
1. 2 
199€-'  98,803,905  832  12,171  8,124  5,171  19,879  27,4)1 
1996"  SU,975,555  144  3.104  i.7U5  2,U27  1,421 
Sources.  899  "Coileotive Bargaining Negotiations end Uontrarts, '  1976 to 1997  815  "Doeployneot und  Uarncogs 
Boto'  All figures  in thousands 
"Pu  Nu000 Uron BID "Employment end  teroingc." Table S 
Comparison  of trading stoppage  reasons between  companies  in the Bureau  of 
National  Affairs'  sample  and the remainder  of  the CRSP  NYSE/AMEX  data 
CRSP Code for Trading  *  Status  of Stock 
(Variable  Name ISTPCD) 
.  Not  in 
Sample 
In 
Sample  Total 








Merge  into 



















Chi-square  with 2 Degrees of Freedom: 
Probability  of  Greater  Chi-square: 
2.443 
D.295 
Sources:  BNA "Collective Bargaining  Negotiations  and Contracts,"  1976  to 
1987.  CRSP tapes with data  through  12/31/86. 
ow  percentages  in  parentheses. 
Note:  Categories  for Unknown  at this time, Liquidated,  Delisted  by Exchange, 
Suspended  by Exchange,  and Suspended  by SEC are omitted.  Hence  the Total  in 
Sample  in  this table  is smaller than  the total number  of companies  used in 
this study. Table  6 
Observations  per year  of reporting  risk  by takeover  Status 
Percentile 
Rank 
Companies  Taken Over 
Comanies  Not 
Taken  Over 
















































Observations  721  288  288 
Mean  0.48  0.57  0.25 
Standard  Dev  0.76  1.11  0.62 
Sources:  BNA "Collective  Bargaining  Negotiations  and Contracts,"  1976  to 
1987. Table 7 
Regression  coefficients  and test statistics  for levels  of real wage growth 
(percent)  prior to and following  takeovers  and CEO changes 
Variable*  Coefficient  Estimates (Standard  Errors) 
Annual Growth  (Percent)  of Real Wage  Dependent  Variable 
Event  Indicators: 
FTC:  Contract  Settlement  Date prior to  0.03  Dli  0.19  0.24 
Takeover  Date  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (016) 
FTC:  Contract  Settlement  Date prior to  —0.01  —0.01  0.15  0.03 
Takeover  Date  with CEO Change  (0.23)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.25) 
FTC:  Contract  Settlement  Date following  —0.33  —0.32  —0.41  —0.31 
Takeover  Date*  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.23: 
FTC:  Contract  Settlement  Date following  0.47  0.42  —0.19  —0.46 
Takeover  Date* with CEO Change  (0.42)  (0.44)  (0.43)  (C.46 








Industry  efferts**  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Year effects**  .  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Standard  error  of  the equation  3.91  4.17  4.11  4.39 
Adusted  R—squared  ...  — 
.34  .25  .27  57 
F—statistic  for  PTO—PTC—rrO—flC—D  D.66  0.74  2.85  2.53 
Degrees  of Freedom  (4,5290)  (4,5301)  (4,5327)  (4.533H 
Frohability  of greater  F  .  .62  .56  .02  .94 
F—statistic  for PTO—FTO  2.06  2.65  5.36  4.23 
Degrees  of Freedom  (1,5290)  (1,5301)  (1,5327)  (1,531St 
Prohability  of greater  F  .15  .10  .02  .04 
F—statistic  for FTC—FtC  1.03  0.73  0.50  .86 
Degrees  of  Freedom  —..  (1,5290)  (1,5301)  (1,5327)  (1.5339 
Frohability  of greater  F  ....-  .31  .39  .48  .36 
F—statistic  for  PTO+FTC—FT0+flC  0.09  0.00  5.18  5.95 
Degrees  of Freedom  (1,5290)  (1,5301)  (1,5127)  (1.5236 
Frohability  of greater  F  .76  .99  .02  .01 
Note:  OLE weighted by employment. 
cAll oquations  also include  the following  conditioning  variables:  The CPI,  constant 
(1982)  dollar  GNP,  and the civilian  unemployment  rate, all entered  as rates of  change  once 
the  year prior  to the settlement  date;  the log of the  real wage at the  end of the 
previous contract,  and the percent  difference  between  the wage at the  end of the previon' 
contract  and the wage in the (2—digit  SIC)  industry  in the  month prior to the  settlement 
month.  All variables  are entered  both linearly  and as squares.  The F—statistic  6cr:::: 
joint significance  of  the squared  terms is significant  at the .001 level  in all 
specifications. 
'°°Yeer and Industry  indicators  are both jointly  significant  at the  .0001 level in on 
F—test  of joint  significance. Table 8 
Regression  coefficients  for levels  of real wage growth (percent) 
prior to and following  takeovers 
Coefficient  Estimates (Standard  Errors) 
Dependent  Variable 
Variable 
Annual  Growth (Percent)  of  Real Wage 
Evenr  Indicators: 
FTO:  Contract  Settlement  Date prior to  D.45  0.54  0.69  0.50 
Takeover  Date  (0.38)  (D.38)  (0.40)  (0.36) 
FTC:  Contract  Settlement  Date prior to  3.82  2.85  3.67  1.94 
Takeover  Date with CEO Change  (1.58)  (1.57)  (1.68)  (1.51) 
FTO:  Contract  Settlement  Date following  —1.99  —1.94  —2.20  —1.93 
Takeover  Date*  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.53)  (0.49) 
FTC:  Contract  Settlement  Date following  3.68  3.60  3.61  3.44 
Takeover  Dare*  with CEO Change  (1.72)  (1.72)  (1.84)  (1.74) 
































Interaction  of Durables  Manufacturing  —0.00  0.11  0.06  0.09 
and FTO Indicators  (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.50)  (0.46) 
Interaction  of Durables  Manufacturing  —4.62  —3.66  —4.62  —2.60 
and FTC Indicators  (1.62)  (1.61)  (1.72)  (3.55: 
Inreraction  of Durables  Manufacturing  2.77  2.74  2.82  2,70 
and fl0 Indicators  (0.63)  (0.63)  (0.68)  (5  (3' 
Interaction  of Durables  Manufacturing  —5.17  —5.01  —5.09  —5' 
and FTC Indicators  (1.82)  (1.81)  (1.94)  (1  5)' 
Interaction  of Non—durables  Manufacturing  —0.57  —0.67  —0.63  —0.75 
snd FTO Indicators  (0,48)  (0.48)  (0.51)  (0 
Interaction  of Non—durables  Manufacturing  —3.85  —3.12  —3.71  —2.2 
and FTC Indicators  (1.66)  (1.65)  (1.77)  (3  63" 
Interaction  of Non—durables  Manufacturing  2.27  2.18  2.34  2  07 
and FTO Indicators  (0.72)  (0.72)  (0.77)  (0.71) 
lnteraction  of Non—durables  Manufacturing  —4.31  —4.26  —3.66  —4,14 
and FTC Indicators  (2.00)  (2.00)  (2.14)  (2.07' 
















Interaction  of Transportation/Utilities  —0.35  —0.69  —0,91  —0 55 
and FTO Indicators  (0.47)  (0.46)  (0.49)  (5.35 
Interaction  of Transportation/Utilities  —3.35  —3.02  —3.27  —2.11 
and FTC Indicators  (2.05)  (2.04)  (2.18)  (2.00) 
Interaction  of Transportation/Utilities  1.68  1.47  2.41  1.62 
and FTO Indicators  (0.63)  (0.63)  (0.66)  (0.63) Table  8  (continued) 
Regression  coefficients  for levels  of real  wage growth (percent) 
prior to and following  takeovers 
Variable  Coefficient  Estimates  (Standard  Errors 
Annual  Growth (Percent)  of  Real Wage  Dependent  Variable 
Ioteraoticn  of  Retail/Wholesale  Trade 
and PTC Indicators 
intercept 
Conditioning  Variables  as in  Table 7 
Interactions  of  X  and Period (82—'87) 
Indicators 
Sector  Indicators 

































Standard  Error of the  Equation 









Note:  OLS weighted  by  employment. Table  9 
Summary of  changes  in levels of  wage  growth  (percent) by sector  from 
before  to  after  takeovers  and CEO changes based  on Table 8 
Change  in  Annual  Percentage 
Wage Growth from  Before  to  Columns  Below  Correspond  to 
After  Event Below:  Columns  on  Table  B 
Mining 
Takeover  —1.17  —2.83  —2.58  —2.81 
Takeover  with  CEO change  0.17  0.22  0.08  0,19 
Durables  Manufacturing 
Takeover  0.33  0.15  —0.13  0.18 
Takeover  with  CEO change  —0.36  —0.45  —0.66  --0.49 
Non—durables  manufacturing 
Takeover  0.40  0.37  0.08  0.42 
Takeover  with  CEO change  —0.20  —0.02  0.07  —0.05 
Transportation*  and Utilities 
Takeover  —0.41  —0.32  0.43  —0.31 
Source:  Table  8 and authors  calculations. 
*Excluding  airlines  - table 10 
Distributions of target firm ehereboider  wealth  rhsnsee  and premiums, and ratios  of union wealth  ohanaro 
tar.n  firm  shareholder  aeaith  ohsn5ee 
tarat  Firm 
Shareholder 
trr5at  Firm 
Shareholder 
Fanoento  is  Wealth Gain  Wealth Sn.— 
Rank  (Millions)  sium  (!)° 
Ratio  of Union  Wealth  Cnnneeeion  to 
fan All takeovere.erer 


































Inc  fable  7,  Frem  table  7, 
Speonfioatlrm  1  Speniftoatios  3e 
From labia 9, 
Speoifiortoon  S 
4.55"  22.05" 
1.27  3.32 
0.34  1.06 
0.25  0.51 
0.10  0.29 
0.03  0.12 
—0.00  0.05 
—0.07  0.01 
—0.34  —0.42 
—2.09  —2.35 











Otearvotiose  212  212  212  212  173 
Fror  ColOn  0, 











001 "Cullrotlve Oorsonnins  9ertiatiuse and Cnstrsote,  1976  to  1987. 
011  frloyerent,  Hours,  and Esrnin;e," 1965 (Supplement,  1957). 
1. Thenber of Cerce tmployee Oerefite,"  1975  to  1997. 
Results  from tables 7 and 9. 
2002 nupee ci  th information  through  12131/99. 
mInor' e  oalrulntione. 
SaCS.  Value.  era  ordered  within  serb  nrlene.  8enneehorehrlderwealth  sties  at  esrb  p.roemti 
oonl  oar  out  nereee s010.y  the  erme  snrnee  rrlenis, 
thnauuCloutlor  4 is ueed  Cnn  the  tekenver  moth  fF53  rbengeoeeee.  flame  this  risea the  eetimatee 
noel  fovnreble tr the wealth  tremafer  hypoth.eie, 
::O0,.utoot dnllan  11967  breed)  figuree, is  milidaees,  ten the  ieia  end mexi.n  velure  no  the 
nunlo nolume erase fullnwe (Usirm oonnersisn/!herebalder  sais): 
Frem  table  7,  Frees  table  7.  Frem  tebie 9,  Form  table  9, 
Speoifirrtien  1  Speeifirsnnrm  3°  Openiftostnrs  1  !pennforetinn  4 
Floolmaa  11.5/2.5  11.0/0.5!  —0.15/—0.015  5.3/0.50 
Miedran  0,16/—0.003  0.271-0.023  -22.9/2,3  5.9/thoU 
7onrt form ehenrbrldervsalth  soon  is the iorreaee  in the nestet (1997)  dollar  value  of  notetandins 
of  000eeon  etnnh over the emsth oomtsinisg  nbc torso mesiioa of the takeover.  the prewdora  is  tha sam 
dunidod by  nba nsiue en the sad of the previous  womth. 
0000700  takeovers  witb CEO ohangse  osly, the norreepemdthg eedime vales. ane: 
Colic  7, Openifinatlrm  1:  52 obeervetione,  ratio of -0.02 at the madlam. 
ColIc 7, Opeolfnoetlns  4:  52 nbsarvanlona,  ratIo of  0.21  sO the medic, 
tobla 9, Openifina000s  1:  39 observetirna, ratio of  0.03 at the wedias. 
taboo 9, Upandfdratdrr  4:  39 rbaorvatdose,  ratio of  0.06 at the medico. 